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Welch: Mandatory Retirement of Appointed State Judges: Balancing State

MANDATORY RETIREMENT OF APPOINTED
STATE JUDGES: BALANCING STATE
AND FEDERAL INTERESTS
In 1967 Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA" or "Act'),' and in the process established a national policy of
eradicating arbitrary age discrimination in the workplace. The ADEA is
intended "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age."2 The Act prohibits all employers from discharging employees
because of their age, or from classifying employees in a way that would affect
their status as employees because of their age.3 As originally enacted, the
ADEA neither applied to the federal government nor to the states or their
political subdivisions. To close this gap in coverage, in 1974 Congress extended
the substantive prohibitions of the Act to the federal and state governments by
amending the definition of "employer.'
The 1986 amendments to the Act, which effectively barred mandatory
retirement of protected employees, coupled with Congress' decision in 1974 to
bring state government workers within the protection of the Act, have combined
to prompt appointed state court judges to question the validity of their state's
mandatory retirement provisions. 5 State judges assert that because they are

1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621((b), 2(b) (1988). (t is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment.").
For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the ADEA, see Note, The Age
Discrimination in Fmployment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. REV. 380 (1976).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). As originally enacted, the protection of the Act was limited to
workers between the ages of 40 and 65. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967), (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631)). Congress amended the Act in 1978,
raising the age limit to 70 (Pub. L. No. 95-256, Section 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978)), and again in
1986, removing any upper age limit. Pub. L. No. 99-592, Sections 2(c) and 6(a), 100 Stat. 3342,
3344 (1986), (amending 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1)). As a result, the ADEA now protects any worker
over 39 years of age and bars mandatory retirement.
4. Pub. L. No. 93-259, Section 28(a)(l)-(4), 88 Stat. 55 (1974), (amending 29 U.S.C. §
630(b)). 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), now provides in relevant part: "The term [employer] also means ...
(2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or political
subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency,.....
5. See, e.g., VT. CONST. ch. II § 35, which provides: "All justices of the Supreme Court and
judges of all subordinate courts shall be retired at the end of the calendar year in which they attain
seventy years of age or at the end of the term of election during which they attain seventy years of
age,...."
Presently, thirty-five states have mandatory retirement provisions for at least some members
of their judiciary. See AMERICAN BAR AS'N, A SURVEY OF JUDICIAL FRINGE BENEFITS, Table I
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employees protected by the Act, their state mandatory retirement provisions
violate the ADEA, and that by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, 6 the ADEA
takes precedence over conflicting state laws mandating retirement even if the
laws are contained in state constitutional provisions. 7
An analysis of the application of the ADEA to appointed state judges raises
two interrelated issues. First, did Congress intend to include appointed judges
among the "employees" protected by the Act, or did Congress intend appointed
state court judges to fall within one of the exceptions to the Act's definition of
"employees?"' Second, may Congress constitutionally protect appointed judges
from mandatory retirement?9 Congress' decision to enact legislation that will
regulate a state's conduct, although a power indisputably reserved to
Congress,'" raises classic federalism concerns. For example, Congress may
have a concern in eradicating age-based discrimination in the workplace,
including such discrimination practiced by a state, while a state may assert an
interest in determining the characteristics of its work force, including its
judiciary. When those interests conflict -- where a state seeks to use age-related
criteria such as mandatory retirement to determine who may serve as a judge -it is necessary to determine whether the federal interest takes precedence. In so
doing, one must evaluate Congress' intent on the question of whether state
judges are protected against age discrimination.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals" and federal district courts in
Vermont 2 and Virginia 3 have concluded that appointed state judges are
protected by the ADEA, and accordingly, have enjoined the application of state

(1988).
In seventeen of these states (Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,

Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming), judges are appointed on at
least one level. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF STATES, Table 4.4 (1988-89)
[hereinafter COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS]. In addition, in eleven of the thirty-five states with

mandatory retirement provisions, judges are appointed for a term and are then subject to a retention
election.

These states include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,

Maryland, Missouri, Utah, and Wyoming. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
7. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ('EEOC') has litigated several of these
recent cases involving mandatory retirement after receiving charges from appointed state judges.
The EEOC is the agency charged by Congress with the interpretation, administration, and
enforcement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631 (1988),
and other federal statutes prohibiting employment discrimination.
8. See infra notes 27-111 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 117-63 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 117-46 and accompanying text.
11. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990).
12. EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261 (D. Vt. 1989).
13. Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on othergrounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th
Cir. 1988).
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mandatory retirement provisions.
However, the First 4 and Eighth Circuit
Courts of Appeals two federal district courts,' 6 as well as two state supreme
courts,' 7 have held that the ADEA does not protect state judges from
mandatory retirement. To resolve this split in the circuits, the United States
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the case decided by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Gregory v. Ashcroft.'
This note will examine whether the ADEA protects appointed 9 state court
judges from mandatory retirement. In the "Statutory Analysis" section, the Note
examines the text of the ADEA and its legislative history to determine whether
Congress intended to protect appointed state judges from mandatory
retirement.' The Note proposes that those courts finding that appointed judges
are not protected by the ADEA have misinterpreted the plain meaning of the
employee exceptions to the ADEA and the legislative debate that preceded
enactment of the ADEA and its subsequent amendments. 2'
In the "Constitutional Analysis" section, the Note analyzes the application
of the ADEA to state judges as a proper exercise of Congress' Commerce
Clause power under Article I of the United States Constitution. 2 This section
also examines the standard that courts apply in seeking to discern Congress'
intent when it enacts laws that regulate state conduct.' An analysis of relevant
case law compels the conclusion that Congress has the authority to regulate state
functions through the Commerce Clause, and that Congress clearly expressed its
intent to extend ADEA protection to state and local governments. This statutory
and constitutional analysis will demonstrate that the ADEA protects appointed
state judges from mandatory retirement.

14. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), aff'g, 680 F. Supp. 455 (D. Mass. 1988).
15. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S.
Nov. 27, 1990) (No. 90-50).
16. EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Ill. 1989), appeal pending, No. 89-3421 (7th
Cir.); Gregory v. Ashcroft, No. 88-0221C(3) (E.D. Mo. July 14, 1989).
17. In re Stout, 521 Pa. 570, 559 A.2d 489 (1989); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen'l,
401 Mass. 427, 517 N.E.2d 141 (1988).
18. 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted 59 U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1990) (No.

90-50).
19. Electedjudges are clearly exempted from ADEA coverage. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1988).

("The term 'employee' means an individual employed by any employer except that the term
'employee' shall not include any person elected to public office....").

20.
21.
22.
23.

Infra notes 24-111 and accompanying text.
Infra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 112-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 164-200 and accompanying text.
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STATUTORY ANALYSIS

The ADEA broadly protects employees from arbitrary age discrimination
in the workplace with narrowly defined exemptions for elected officials and
certain policymaking appointees.'
The determination of whether appointed
judges are protected by the ADEA is a fairly straightforward inquiry: Did
Congress intend to include appointed state judges within the "appointee on the
policymaking level" exemption to ADEA coverage?' Properly understood in
light of the legislative history, this provision only exempts appointees in the
legislative and executive branches of government, and even if Congress meant
to exempt appointees in all three branches of government, appointed judges are
not exempt from coverage because they are not primarily policymakers. Since
this interpretation results in an exemption for elected, but not appointed judges,
it is also necessary to analyze the rationality of a distinction between elected and
appointed state judges for ADEA protection.'

24. 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1988), provides:
The term 'employee' means an individual employed by any employer except that the
term 'employee' shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or
political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen
by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the
policymaking level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding
sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision. The term 'employee'
includes any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer
in a workplace in a foreign country.
25. Several Supreme Court opinions state that original legislative intent, as reflected either in
the language of the statute or the relevant legislative history, is the touchstone for statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 95 (1989) (lower court counsel fee
cases binding on Supreme Court because mentioned in committee report and apparently approved
by Congress); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, _ U.S.
, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2566
(1989) (clear and unambiguous language can be trumped by "other evidence of congressional
intent'); Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214 (1984) (*sole task" of Court in statutory
interpretation is to determine congressional intent).
26. Determining congressional intent, at least when that intent is not obvious from the language
of the statute, is particularly difficult because the courts must ascribe an intention not only to
individuals, but to a sizeable group of individuals-actually, to two different groups of people (the
House and the Senate)-whose views are known only from the historical record. For an analysis of
collective intent, see Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory ofInterpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 34849 (1985); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930). See also
DWORKIN, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A MArrER OF PRINCIPLE 316 (1985).
Historical records rarely disclose the reasons why each legislator voted for or against a
proposed law. In fact, legislators vote for bills out of many unknowable motives, such as loyalty
or deference to party and committee, a desire not to alienate blocks of voters, and pure matters of
conscience. See, e.g., R. DAVIDSON & W. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 388, 401 (2d
ed. 1985); M. COLUE, Voting Behavior in Legislatures, in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
471-518 (Lowenberg, Patterson & Jewell eds. 1985).
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A. Congress IntendedAppointed State CourtJudges to be Employees Protected
by the ADEA
The various states in the recent cases involving ADEA protection of
appointed state judges are without question "employers" covered by the
ADEA.V Congress extended ADEA coverage to state and local governments
in 1974 when it amended the definition of employer to include the states."
Thus, the states are employers of appointed judges. The ADEA defines
"employee" broadly as an individual employed by an employer and exempts
from that definition certain elected and appointed officials.'
Several courts
have agreed that appointed judges are employees according to the broad
language of the ADEA.
As one court noted, judges show traditional
employee characteristics, such as working under the direction and control of the
state, drawing salaries, and performing other employee duties.3 Although the
legislative history of the ADEA lacks any discussion of the definition of
"employee,"32 an analysis of the legislative history of Title VII indicates by
analogy that judges are "employees" within the generic sense of that term.33

27. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1990) ('There is no question that the
State is an employer to which the Act applies and that Vermont's judges are employed by the
State.").
28. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
29. See supra note 24.
30. See EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Schlitz v. Virginia, 681
F. Supp. 330, 333 (E.D. Va. 1988).
31. Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330, 333 (E.D. Va. 1988) (Virginia judges are paid a
salary and receive other benefits from Virginia, are hired through gubernatorial appointment with
confirmation by the state senate, are subject to terms and conditions prescribed by Virginia, and
exercise the judicial and equitable powers of Virginia.). See also EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Assoc., 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983) (held that
where salaried officers performed traditional employee duties and drew salaries as employees, they
were covered by the ADEA).
32. See Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 698-99 (1st Cir. 1983) ("The
legislative history behind the 1974 amendment is less than abundant, as this revision was included
in a much broader package of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §
201 etseq.").
33. The legislative history of Title VII is instructive because its definition of the term
"employee," including the exemptions, is identical to the ADEA definition and exemptions. See
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(t) (1988). The courts have found the
legislative history and the judicial interpretation for Title VII to be controlling for identical ADEA
provisions. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (adopting
construction of Title VII section 706(c) for interpretation of ADEA section 14(b), "since the
legislative history of Section 14(b) [of the ADEA] indicates that its source was Section 706(c) [of
Title VII]'); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (recognizing that ADEA prohibitions
"were derived in haec verba from Title VII").
The legislative history from Title VII supports the conclusion that judges are employees in the
general sense indicated by the ADEA. Senator Ervin noted during Senate debates on amendments
to the definition of "employee" that the coverage of the "employed by an employer" language was
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The more troubling analysis is whether appointed state court judges are
"employees" in the technical way that term is defined by the ADEA. 34
The definition of "employee" excepts two broad groups from the protection
of the Act.35 In the first group are elected officials of a state or its political
divisions. 6 The second group includes some of the officials appointed by
those elected officials. 37
Specifically, the second group includes three
categories of appointees: (1) "person[s] chosen by such officer to be on such
officer's personal staff," (2) "appointee[s] on the policymaking level," and (3)
"immediate adviser[s] with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal
powers of the office." The only exemption to the term "employee" that can
possibly include appointed judges is the "appointee on the policymaking level
exemption."'
The first exemption excluding elected officials is clearly not
applicable.39 The second exemption, excluding those on the elected officer's
personal staff, is also distinguished by virtue of the separation of powers; a
judge is, of course, independent of elected officials.' ° And the final exemption
excluding an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional

broad:
The bill defines a State and political subdivision of a State as employers.... It defines an
employee as one who is employed by an employer. The dictionary states that any person or
concern which employe another, usually for wages or a salary, is an employer. Under these
provisions, no one is excepted. In other words, the bill is broad enough in its present form
to cover Governors of States, State supreme court justices, State legislators, and so forth.
118 CONG. REc. 4096 (1972) (Remarks of Senator Ervin). The only exception taken to Senator
Ervin's characterization of the employee language was by Senators Javits and Taft, who believed
that elected officials would not be covered by the definition. 118 CONG. REc. 4097 (1972)
(Remarks of Senator Javits); 118 CONG. REc. 1838 (1972) (Remarks of Senator Taft).
34. See supra note 24.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1988). See supra note 24 for text of definition.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1988).
37. Id.
38. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1988).
39. The effect of this exemption for those appointed judges who are subject to a retention
election is not so clear. See EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 264 n.3 (D. Vt. 1989) ("A
retention vote by the state assembly does not constitute an election by the qualified voters of a
state."); Gregory v. Ashcroft, No. 88-0221C(3), at 4 n.3 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 1989) (appointed
judges subject to retention vote by electorate do not fall within the ADEA's exception for "any
person elected to public office." (emphasis in original)). But cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598,
600 (8th Cir. 1990) ("we are inclined to disagree with this aspect [that appointed Missouri judges
are not elected within the meaning of the ADEAI of the District Court's decision, [but] the Governor
did not cross-appeal this issue, it was not briefed by either side, and it is not properly beforeus.");
EEOC Opinion Letter to Rep. Claude Pepper, April 7, 1987, reprinted inEEOC Compliance Man.
(BNA), at N: 1001 n.2 (a state judge "who is appointed by the Governor or the legislature but must
appear on a ballot before the general electorate for either retention or rejection would be excepted
from the term 'employee' under the ADEA as a 'person elected to public office.").
40. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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or legal powers of the elected official's office also does not cover judges.4'
The applicability of the "policymaker" exemption requires a two-part
analysis. First, which appointees on the policymaking level did Congress intend
to exempt? The most reasoned answer to this question is that Congress intended
to limit the policymaker exemption to the close advisers of the elected official,
thus not reaching members of the judiciary. However, assuming that Congress
intended the policymaker exemption to have a broad reach, the second part of
the analysis examines whether judges are on a policymaking level.
1. Only Appointees who Directly Advise an Elected Official are Exempt from
ADEA Coverage
An analysis of the contents and structure of the language of the exemption
suggests that Congress intended to exempt only those policymaking officials who
work for the elected official.4' Both the first and last clause, i.e., the elected
official's personal staff and his immediate advisors, refer to persons who work
for the elected official. The most logical inference is that the middle category,
appointees on the policymaking level, shares basic characteristics of the
categories that surround it.43 In order to exempt judges, one would have to
conclude that Congress chose first to list elected officials, then to list a group
of persons who work for the elected officials, then to move outside the elected
officials' realm and list a group of persons who are independent of them, and
then to return again to list another group of persons who work for the elected
officials." The more reasonable interpretation is that the entire exemption
relates to elected officials and those persons who are in a close working
relationship with the elected official--his or her close advisers, personal staff,
and cabinet-style officials. '

41. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1988).
42. The EEOC has characterized Congress' intent in exempting policymaking appointees as
follows:
Congress realized the necessity of allowing elected officials complete freedom in
appointing those who would direct state and local departments and agencies. These
individuals must work closely with elected officials and their advisors in developing
policies that will implement the overall goals of the elected officials. In order to achieve
these goals, an elected official is likely to prefer individuals with similar political and
ideological outlooks. Congress intended to allow elected officials the freedom to appoint
those with whom they feel they can work best.
EEOC Decision No. 78-42, Empi. Prac. EEOC Dec. (CCH) P6725 (Sept. 29, 1978).
43. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1989),
44. Brief for EEOC as Appellant at 10, EEOC v. Illinois, No. 89-3421 (7th Cir.).
45. The EEOC has taken the position that judges are covered by the ADEA in an opinion letter
from its legal counsel to Senator Claude Pepper. EEOC Opinion Letter to Rep. Claude Pepper,
reprinted in EEOC Compliance Man. (BNA) at N:1001 n.2 (Apr. 7, 1987). When the language of
a statute is vague and the intent of Congress indiscernible, courts should defer to the EEOC's
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Interpreting the exemption to reach only appointees who work for the
elected official is supported by the relevant Title VII legislative history regarding
an identical provision that was created in 1972 when Congress amended Title
VII to include the states as employers.' The legislative history of Title VII
is particularly appropriate because Congress viewed arbitrary discrimination
based on age as comparable to the race, sex, religious, and national origin
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 47 Senator Ervin introduced the
exemption for elected officials so that the democratic process would be
protected. 4 Senator Ervin advocated the exemption for elected officials to
prevent the Act from allowing federal courts to question whether the electorate
was motivated by discrimination in the election of a public official.49 Senator
Ervin argued that the protection for elected officials should be augmented by

construction of the ADEA. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 470 U.S.
116, 126 (1984).
Additionally, attorneys general from three states have issued official opinions stating that
judges are "employees" covered by the ADEA because they do not fit within any of the exemptions
contained in section 11(0. See 71 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 68 (Dec. 29, 1986); 87-5 Op. S.C. Att'y
Gen. 23 (Jan. 1987); 87-8 Op. Vt. Att'y Gen. (Aug. 7, 1987). The EEOC has observed that the
fact that three state attorneys general have found that appointed state judges are covered by the
ADEA is especially persuasive considering "the natural proclivity of state officials to protect state
prerogatives and 'resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of power, emolument and
consequencesof the offices they hold under the State establishments.'" Brief for EEOC as Appellant
at 8 n.9, EEOC v. Illinois, No. 89-3421 (7th Cir.) (citing THE FEDERALIST, No. 1, at 4 (A.
Hamilton) (Wesleyan Univ. Press ed. 1961)).
46. See supra note 24. Section 701(f) of Title VII, as amended, states:
The term 'employee' means an individual employed by an employer, except that the
term 'employee:' shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or
political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen
by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the
policymaking level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding
sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State
government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988).
47. See 118 CONG. REC. 15895 (1972) (Remarks of Senator Bentsen regarding the 1972
amendmentsto Title VII: "1 believe that the principles underlying these provisions in the EEOC bill
are directly applicable to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act."). The frequent comparison
in the legislative history of the Act between discrimination based on age and discrimination based
on race, sex, religion, and national origin confirm this view. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 2597
(1964) (remarks of Rep. Pucinski); 113 CONG. REc. 31256-31257 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Young);
118 CONG. REc. 15895 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen); 123 CONG. REC. 30563 (1977) (remarks
of Rep. Pepper).
48. 118 CONG. REC. 4096 (1972) (without the exemption, the Act would "give the Federal
courts jurisdiction to inquire as to ... [whether] the people were actuated in any extent [by
discrimination] in the election of a public official, so that [the EEOC] could come in and remove
that public official from office or that adviser from office and dictate who should be employed in
his place.").
49. Id.
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exempting their advisers.' The plain language used by Senator Ervin indicates
that Congress intended to exempt only elected officials and their personal
advisers. 5 The senators also debated the reach of the exemption to persons
who did not work directly for the elected official. Senator Ervin agreed with
Senator Williams that the purpose of the amendment was to exempt from
coverage those appointees who are in a close personal and immediate
relationship with the elected official.5 2
Moreover, the conference committee reports submitted following the
debates support this interpretation of the exemption.13 The conference
managers' report states: "It is the intention of the conferees to exempt elected
officials and members of their personal staffs, and persons appointed by such
elected officials as advisers or to policymaking positions at the highest levels of
the departments or agencies of State or local governments, such as cabinet
officers, and persons with comparable responsibilities at the local level."' The
report concluded that it was the conferees' intent that the exemption should be
construed narrowly.55 Courts that have interpreted the ADEA's "appointee on
the policymaking level" exemption, although not necessarily in the context of
mandatory retirement of appointed state court judges, support the conclusion that
Congress intended to exempt only those appointed officials who work directly

50. 118 CONG. REc. 4485 (1972).
51. See also 118 CONG. REC. at 4485 (Title VII exemption introduced so that "Federal judges
cannot remove elected state and county officials from office or tell them whom they have to have
as their selections to advise them with respect to their constitutional and legal responsibilities.").
52. 118 CONG. REc. 4492-93 (1972). See also EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 798-800 (2d
Cir. 1990).
53. Courts have found conference committee reports to be reliable indicators of legislative
intent. See Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 264-65 (1945); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S.
547, 551 (1921).
54. An argument can be made that Congress did not intend to include the judiciary within the
policymaker exemption since a state's judiciary is not comparable to state departments and agencies,
e.g., the Department of Revenue, nor to cabinet officers or similar persons at the local government
level. See EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Vt. 1989) ("The language 'departments
or agencies of State or local governments' further suggests that Congress did not intend the
exemptions to extend to members of a separate branch of state government such as the judiciary.
Departments and agencies are part of the executive branch of government.'). See also Brief for
Appellants at 11-13, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-2360).
At first blush, the argument that the judiciary is not a department or agency of a state has
some appeal. However, as the Eighth Circuit correctly held in Gregory v. Ashcrofi, 898 F.2d 598,
602 (8th Cir. 1990), it is more realistic to view the state judiciary as one of the more powerful
"agencies" of state government.
55. Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers at the Conference on H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess., reprinted in part in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2137, 2179, 2180 (1972).
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for the elected official.56
The First Circuit refused to limit the policymaker exemption to advisers of
elected officials, holding that Congress intended to exempt two categories:
"policymakers, who need not be advisers; and advisers, who need not be
policymakers."5 However, the legislative history of the ADEA belies this
interpretation. According to the legislative history, "advisers" is a term that
includes the types of officials, apart from elected officials, who are exempted
by the statute: personal staff, appointees on the policymaking level, and
"immediate advisers with respect to the constitutional or legal powers of the
office."' The First Circuit decision assumed that "policymakers" comprise a
separate category of officials who are not among an elected official's advisers.
This holding misreads the statute."
The legislative history compels the
conclusion that "policymakers" are not separate from "advisers," but rather are
among the advisers exempted. 6 Congress meant to exempt persons who
worked for the elected official, but limited that exemption to specific
categories. 6' These categories, namely, those who are personal staffers, close
advisers, or high policymaking level officers of the elected official, are separate,
but they are subcategories of persons who work closely with an elected official.
If one accepts the argument that Congress intended to exempt only those
appointees who are the elected officials' closest and highest level advisers, then
it follows that judges appointed by the governor or state legislature are not

56. See Anderson v. Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796, 801 (10th Cir. 1982) (court emphasized that
the purpose of the exclusion from coverage under § 2000(e) was to "exempt ... those who are
chosen by the Governor or the mayor ... , whatever the elected official is, and who are in a close
personal relationship and an immediate relationship with him. Those who are his first line of
advisors."). See also Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1375 (10th Cir. 1979) (§ 2000(e) exemption
applied "only to those individuals who are in highly intimate and sensitive positions of responsibility
on the staff of the elected official"); EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Vt. 1989) ('The
ADEA's exemptions include elected officials as well as those whose power and job tenure emanate
directly from elected officials."); Bostick v. Rappleyea, 629 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D.N.Y. 1985)
(legislative budget analyst not the type of position that was "sensitive and intimate" to the Legislative
Committee that employed her, so as to fall within the "policymaking" or "immediate advisor"
exceptions to § 2000(e).).
57. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 55-56 (1st Cir. 1988).
58. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
59. 858 F.2d at 55-56.
60. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 24, 43-45 and accompanying text.
62. Judges appointed by a member of the judiciary require a closer analysis. The following
states appoint some of their judges by members of their judiciary: Alaska, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and South Dakota. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 5. See, e.g, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 39 (1989) (Circuit judges appoint associate judges to serve as trial
judges in the circuit courts). The analysis should focus on how cases are assigned to the appointed
judge, and how much discretion the judge retains in deciding cases. In Illinois, once the associate
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exempt since, as judges, they are independent of any elected official.' This
appears to be the most reasonable analysis of the exemption, as well as the one
most consistent with the legislative history. Further, this analysis allows the
courts to resolve the matter without considering the more complex issue of
whether judges are "on the policymaking level" in the general sense.
Yet, the First and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal, in holding that
appointed judges are not protected by the ADEA, have virtually ignored the
legislative history on the exemption requiring a close working relationship
between elected officials and their appointees.' These courts concluded that
Congress intended to exempt appointees on the policymaking level across all
three branches of government and confined their analysis to the role of judges
as policymakers.' These courts not only erroneously interpreted the reach of
the exemption, but further erred by finding that appointed judges are primarily
policymakers.
2.

Are Judges "Policymakers?"

Courts deciding whether appointed state judges are protected by the ADEA
should not find it necessary to examine the general question of whether judges
are policymakers. ' When Congress drafted the definition of "employee" and
exempted elected officials and their closest advisers, it intended a specialized
notion of policymaking.67 However, despite the indications that Congress did
not intend to include judges within the policymaker exemption, several courts
that have considered the application of the ADEA to appointed judges have

judge receives an assignment from the chief judge or someone designated by the chief judge, the
associate judge conducts the proceedings independent of any direction by circuit judges. SeePeople
ex rel. Filkin v. Flessner, 48 Ill. 2d 54, 56, 268 N.E.2d 376 (1971) (judge of circuit court and
associate judge are members of the same court and circuit judge was not entitled to command an
associate judge by any writ of mandamus or prohibition). One should also analyze the appeal
procedure and whether decisions rendered by the appointed judge are appealed directly to the
reviewing court without review of the appointing judge. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. Art. VI, § 6, and
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 301 (1989).
63. For instance, the Vermont judiciary is separate from the executive branch and exercises its
own legal and constitutional powers. The Supreme Court of Vermont is not authorized to give
advisory opinions to the Governor; it resolves legal controversies between adverse litigants. See In
re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. 524, 64 A.2d 169 (1949).
64. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858
F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1988). See also supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
65. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600-02 (8th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858
F.2d 52, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1988). See also EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. ll. 1989).
66. A policy is a "projected program consisting of desired objectives and the means to achieve
them." Policies are guideposts for present and future conduct. Laws, whether judge-made or
statutory, are mandatory standards of conduct. WEBSTER THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1971);
EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Vt. 1989).
67. See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
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focused on generalized notions of the role of the judiciary.'
Under this
approach, judges inevitably will be exempt from ADEA coverage since they are,
to a certain extent, policymakers.
The test, however, for courts engaging in
this type of policymaker analysis should be whether an official is primarily
involved with making policy.' To require a lower standard would render the
exemption meaningless since many persons, especially most state government
officials, could be characterized as policymakers. 7" Thus, if courts are going
to engage in this analysis, then the proper inquiry should be what Congress
perceived the role of judges to be.'
The legislative history of the ADEA is devoid of any meaningful discussion
of the definition of "employee."'
However, the primary mover of the
identical Title VII provision, Senator Ervin, would not have considered
appointed judges to be exempt under the policymaker exemption because he did
not consider policymaking to be the role of the judiciary.74 Ervin believed that
the role of the United States Supreme Court was that of an adjudicator, "which
determines judicially legal controversies between adverse litigants."75 The
Court, according to Ervin, has no "discretionary power to fashion policies based
on such considerations as expediency or prudence.... "76 Ervin added that
justices are denied policymaking power and are endowed instead "with power
to interpret any provision of the Constitution or any law or treaty which is
determinative of the issue arising in a case coming before them."'

68. See e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1990); EEOC v.
Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1988); In re Stout, 521 Pa. 571, 559 A.2d 489, 495-97
(1989).
69. See Gold, The Similarity of Congressional and JudicialLawmaking Under Titie VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 721, 748 (1985) ("[E]ventually, the judges will
take possession of a statute and, for practical purposes, convert it to a common law doctrine that
courts are free to modify. For as time passes, the judges will deal with more aspects of a social
issue than the legislature could have foreseen."); Kaplan, Do IntermediateAppellate Courts Have
a Lawmaking Function? 70 MASS. L. REV. 10, 11 (1985) ("the intermediate courts will not be
confined to the correction of the judgments of the trial courts for breach of established doctrines,
but will make law, and will contribute significantly to the evolution of law*); Clinton, Judges Must
Make Law: A Realistic Appraisal of the JudicialFunction in a Democratic Society, 67 IowA L.
REV. 711 (1982) (as a matter of necessity, judges from time to time make, rather than interpret,
law); Hopkins, The Role of an IntermediateAppellate Court, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 459 (1975).
70. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
71. See EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Vt. 1989).
72. See infra notes 73-79.
73. See supra note 32.
74. S. ERVIN & R. CLARK, ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT: POLICYMAKER OR ADJUDICATOR
(1970). See Brief for EEOC as Appellee at 21, EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990)
(No. 89-6178).
75. S. ERVIN & R. CLARK, supra note 74, at 1.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 6.
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Further, the conference report accompanying the bill that extended Title VII
coverage to the states demonstrates that the managers of the bill also believed
that judges are not policymakers.'
The managers stated in the conference
report that the exemption applied to the "officials on the highest policymaking
levels such as cabinet members or other immediate advisers of such elected
officials.... "' This language indicates that Congress viewed policymaking in
the traditional sense exercised by members of the executive and legislative
branches, not in terms of the discretion that exists at the margins of
adjudicating.
Congress' perception that policymaking is not the role of the judiciary was
endorsed by both the district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
EEOC v. Vermont.' ° The district court held that "policies are guideposts for
present and future conduct, while laws, whether judge-made or statutory, are
mandatory standards of conduct."' The Second Circuit reasoned that courts
principally resolve disputes by either applying established legal principles or by
The Second Circuit
reconciling seemingly conflicting legal principles.'
implicitly rejected the First Circuit's argument in EEOC v. Massachusettss that
policymaking is a part of the function of judging to the extent that "judging
involves lawmaking to fill the interstices of authority found in constitutions,
statutes, and precedents."'
If the Massachusetts' court type of gap-filling
constituted policymaking, that standard would render most appointed officials
"policymakers," allowing the exemption to swallow the rule.'
However, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Eighth Circuit rejected the reasoning
of the district court in EEOC v. Vermont, and adopted instead the reasoning of
the First Circuit," observing that judges establish either general standards or
specific rules of decision that may be relied upon by other judges, other
branches of government, and attorneys." Regardless of the philosophy of the

78. See Conference Report on H.R. 1746 (Section by Section Analysis), 118 CONG. REc. 7166
(1972).
79. Id.
80. 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'g, 717 F. Supp. 261 (D. Vt. 1989).
81. 717 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Vt. 1989).
82. 904 F.2d 794, 800 (2d Cir. 1990).
83. 858 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1988).
84. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 800 (2d Cir. 1990).
85. EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 264-65 (D. Vt. 1989).
86. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1988) quoting EEOC v. Massachusetts,
680 F. Supp. at 462 (D. Mass. 1988) (policymaking is indisputably a part of the function of judging
to the extent that judging involves lawmaking to fill the interstices of authority found in
constitutions, statutes, and precedents. Moreover, the phrase "on the policymaking level" is
analogous to the interests such as "exercise of discretion" and "exercise of judgment," which
describe most of the performance of judges.).
87. Gregory v. Ashcrofl, 898 F.2d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1990).
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particular judge regarding his proper role, the Eighth Circuit added, some of his
decisions will resolve unsettled areas of the law and become precedent.'
The First and Eighth Circuits fail to recognize that, depending on the level
of the judge, the opportunity for policymaking may be severely limited."
Because appellate courts deal primarily with questions of law and the impact
their interpretation will have on future parties, they will frequently make policy
decisions.'
However, because trial courts deal primarily with factual
9
determinations, they set policy only occasionally.
Therefore, any ruling that
92
overinclusive.
is
all judges are policymakers
To avoid bringing many officials into the policymaking sweep, courts must
apply the exemption only to those officials who are primarily involved with
making policy. This requirement comports with Congress' intent that the
exemption should not be interpreted to swallow the new law affording ADEA
protections to employees of the states.' Therefore, those courts resorting to
a policymaker analysis should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the
appointed judge is primarily a policymaker. The courts should consider the
following factors: the level of the court involved; the state supreme court's
definition of the proper role of its state judiciary;95 the proportion of common
to statutory law in the judge's state; and the type and amount of administrative

88. Id.
89. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 801 (2d Cir. 1990) ('[Elven if we thought Congress
intended to encompass dispute resolution under the rubric of policymaking, we would be hard
pressed to view the exception in § 630(0 as applying to judges of the lower-level courts, for the
exception extends to appointees on a policymaking 'level.' Though lower-court judges... are called
upon at times to fill lacunae in the law, the lower court's decisions may be modified or reversed on
appeal, may easily be overruled in another case, and may even be considered not binding on sister
lower courts.').
90. See H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 32-35 (3rd ed. 1978); Kaplan, supra note 69, at 11;
Hopkins, supra note 69.
91. H. JACOB, supra note 90, at 33.
92. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
93. See Conference Report supra note 78 ('This exemption is ... in no way intended to
establish an overall narrowing of the expanded coverage of State and local governmental
employees....').
94. See supra note 89.
95. For instance, the Supreme Court of Vermont has frequently noted that the power of the
Vermont judiciary is in interpreting the legislature's policies, not making its own. See, e.g., State
v. Jacob, 144 Vt. 70, 472 A.2d 1247, 1250 (1984) (It is not a "legitimate function of this Court to
expand a statute by implication, that is, by reading into it something which is not there, unless it is
necessary in order to make it effective.... To do so would usurp the exclusive prerogative of the
Legislature; ... and violate the border lines drawn by the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers.').
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duties required of the judge." Of course, in light of Congress' intent to
exempt only those advisers who are in a close personal relationship with the
elected official, courts should never have to consider the difficult and potentially
unworkable question of whether appointed judges are primarily policymakers.
Nevertheless, courts that dismiss the legislative history and clear language of the
ADEA and decide the case by determining whether a judge is a policymaker in
a generalized sense should at least examine whether the particular judge is
primarily a policymaker.'
This analysis is bolstered by Congress' explicit intention that the exemptions
for certain state employees be construed very narrowly." Recognizing that
states might try to sweep many employees into the policymaker exemption,
Congress stated its intent that any ambiguity existing in the exemption be
construed in favor of extending the protections against discrimination to as many
state employees as possible." Furthermore, the narrow construction of the
exemption is appropriate since Congress was capable of explicitly exempting
judges if it wished to do so; yet nowhere in the statute, or in the relevant
legislative history, did Congress express a desire to exempt judges. "o
Finally, an argument that Congress did not specifically exempt judges
because most state judges are elected, and therefore, the representatives and
senators would not have had any reason to consider the applicability of the
When Congress
ADEA exemptions to appointed judges, lacks merit.''
extended ADEA coverage to the states, thirty-six states appointed judges at some
level.' 2
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the senators and
representatives from these thirty-six states would have been aware that the

96. The courts must first determine if the judges administrative duties could be considered
policymaking. If such a determination is made, the courts should then weigh the amount and type
of administrative duties with the judge's legal duties. EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 265
(D. Vt. 1989). But see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Furthermore,
many of Missouri's appointed judges exercise considerable policymaking responsibility in the
supervision of the Missouri court system.... The Missouri Supreme Court is responsible for
adopting the rules governing the professional conduct of the Missouri judiciary and the Missouri Bar.
Moreover, the Missouri Supreme Court is responsible for resolving disputes within the judicial
hierarchy.").
97. See Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 55 and accompanying text.
98. See Conference Report, supra note 78; Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 55.
99. See Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 55.
100. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1990); Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F.
Supp. 330, 334 (E.D. Va. 1988).
101. See Brief for Appellee at 13, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 892360EM).
102. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, Table 5 (1972-73).
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"elected official" provision did not exempt all state judges. " Finally, when
Congress created new exemptions to ADEA coverage in 1986, it opted not to
exempt appointed judges."° In fact, the House Rules Committee discussed the
application of the Act to the state judiciary and yet no exemption was created for
appointed state judges."° One may conclude, therefore, that Congress would
not object to ADEA coverage of appointed state judges.
B. Congress' Rationalefor Distinguishing Between Appointed and Elected
Officials
In states where some judges are appointed and others are elected, extension
of the ADEA to appointed judges will have the result of protecting only the
appointed judges from mandatory retirement. This anomaly raises the question
of whether Congress intended to make this type of distinction, and if it did,
whether such a distinction has a rational basis.
The best evidence of Congress' intent to distinguish between elected and
appointed officials is found in the remarks of Senator Ervin during debates
concerning the identical exemption for Title VII.° Senator Ervin expressed
concern that the extension of coverage to the states created the possibility that
elected officials would be covered. Ervin advocated adopting an exemption for
elected officials and their advisers because, without such an exemption, a federal
judge would have the power to second-guess the voters' reasons for electing a
particular official and perhaps to remove that elected official from office."ro
This power would be inconsistent with the democratic process because it would
violate the electorate's need for anonymity and privacy. Furthermore, it would

103. Additionally, over half of the managers of the bill creating the Title VII version of the
exemption were from states where judges were appointed at some level; still, there is no mention
of a desire to exemptjudges. Of the twenty representatives who managed the bill in the house, nine
came from states where appointment was part of the selection process for some judges (Rep.
Hawkins, Rep. Bell, Rep. Burton, California; Rep. Mink, Hawaii; Rep. Clay, Missouri; Rep.
Biaggi, Rep. Kemp, New York; Rep. Pucinski, Illinois; Rep. Brademas, Indiana). Of the twelve
senators who managed the bill in the Senate, six came from states where appointment was part of
the selection process for some judges: Sen. Williams, New Jersey; Sen. Pell, Rhode Island; Sen.
Stevenson, Illinois; Sen. Hughes, Iowa; Sen. Javits, New York; Sen. Stafford, Vermont. See 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2186 (listing managers of the bill in the Senate and House
of Representatives); 1971-72 Cong. Index (CCH) at 1899-1900 and 3381-86 (listing members of
Congress by state); and THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, Table

5 (1972-73) (describing each state's method of judicial selection).
104. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
105. Letter from Senator James M. Jeffords to the Honorable Louis P. Peck (May 18, 1989).
106. See supra note 46-56 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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be impossible for a judge to determine exactly the role that age bias played in
the voting decision."0
Moreover, Congress clearly intended to draw a distinction between elected
and appointed officials, including judges."
It is practically impossible to
determine if the electorate was motivated by discrimination in electing an
official. Congress could have rationally decided to foreclose the possibility of
cases alleging that voters had refused to elect an individual to office because of
his age.
Despite these reasons for differentiating between elected and appointed
officials, several courts have held that appointed judges are not entitled to
ADEA protection because it would create the absurd result of protecting the
appointed judges from mandatory retirement, yet subjecting the elected judges
to mandatory retirement."'
Although it may seem wrong to protect some
judges from mandatory retirement simply because of the way in which they
assumed their offices, that is a policy question left to Congress."' Congress'
choice to distinguish between elected and appointed officials has a rational basis.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS"

2

Once one answers in the affirmative the question of whether Congress

108. In Schlitz v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va. 1988), the district
court found that Congress meant to distinguish between elected and non-elected officials, and that
doing so was not irrational. Id. at 334.
109. Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. at 334 ('Through § 630(0, the ADEA specifically
exempts all elected officials, while only exempting certain appointed officials. The proper
comparison is not the treatment of elected state judges vis-a-vis appointed state judges, but rather
is elected officials generally, vis-a-vis appointed officials. Congress based application of the ADEA
upon whether an official is elected, not whether he is an elected judge.').
110. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, No. 88-0221C(3) (E.D. Mo. 1989) (implying that the
distinction between elected and appointed judges is irrational). However, Gregory fails to mention
the grounds upon which such a distinction is based, while assuming almost off-handedly that
mandatory retirement is rational. Id. at 14-15.
111. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990) ('Any perceived imprudence
in this dichotomy is a matter to be addressed by Congress.'); Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. at
334 ("It is not for this Court to determine whether Congress established the best possible scheme
for combatting age discrimination, and the Court renders no such judgment.').
112. The Constitutional analysis is confined to a discussion of potential Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment implications arising from ADEA coverage of appointed state judges. Because the
Supreme Court has held that age is not a suspect class, any possible Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection challenges are without merit. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a mandatory
retirement provision applied to state judges does not violate the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment since it is a "rational method by which Missouri may serve its legitimate
goal of maintaining a highly qualified and vigorous state judiciary').
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intended to protect appointed state court judges from mandatory retirement, the
next inquiry is whether Congress may constitutionally do so. The First and
Eighth Circuits supported their holdings that Congress may not protect appointed
state judges from mandatory retirement by questioning the federal government's
power to regulate through the Commerce Clause"' a "core state function,"
namely, the characteristics of a state's judiciary." 4 The first prong in the
constitutional analysis is whether Congress possesses the authority to preempt
a state law or constitution on the issues of judicial qualifications and
selection."' If one concludes that Congress has the power to regulate a state's
conduct and thereby preempt a state law that concerns an essential power
reserved to the states, the next question concerns the degree of specificity
required of Congress to preempt the state law." 6
A.

Congress' Power to Regulate State and Local Government Entities

The present position of the Supreme Court is to restrict the Tenth
Amendment' 7 as a restraint on application of federal legislation to state and
local governments."' The Court held in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority," 9 that where Congress has the power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause, notions of traditional state functions will not preclude
exercise of that power directed at the states."' ° However, prior to Garcia the
position of the Court had been to limit the power of the federal government to

113. "The Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the Several states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
114. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir. 1990)("[wle do not think Congress
would have passed legislation that so significantly intrudes on a state's power to regulate its judiciary
without giving serious consideration to the consequences of the legislation, its implication for our
federal system, and the question of its constitutional basis."); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52,
58 (1st Cir. 1988) ("we conclude, therefore, that Congress did not intend to apply the ADEA to
appointed state judges....").
115. See infra notes 117-63 and accompanying text. For an example of the state's arguments
on the issue of Congress' authority to preempt state laws, see Brief for Connecticut as amicus curiae
in support of Appellants at 13-14, EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 89-6178)
[hereinafter Brief for Connecticut]; Brief for the Lincoln Legal Foundation (LLF) and New Mexico
as amicus curiae in support of Appellants at 20, EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990)
(No. 89-6178) [hereinafter Brief for Lincoln Legal Foundation].
116. See infra notes 164-200 and accompanying text.
117. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
118. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 160 (3rd ed. 1986).
119. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
120. Id. at 546-47 ("We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether
a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.' Any such rule leads to inconsistent
results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and it breeds
inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those principles.").
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commercially regulate state or local governments.'
Between 1976 and 1985, the Court attempted to establish tests to determine
when a federal law could or could not be applied to state and local governments
consistently with the Tenth Amendment. In a series of cases, the Court
established that federal law would be an undue extension of the commerce power
if the federal law: (1) regulated the "states as states;" (2) addressed matters that
were attributes of state or local sovereignty; and (3) required state compliance
with the federal law in a manner that directly impaired the ability of state or
local governments to structure operations in areas of traditional functions. "
The Court began a formulation of these tests in National League of Cities, a
significant decision because for the first time since 1936,11 the Supreme Court
placed restrictions on Congress' exercise of its Commerce Clause power."
Under the National League of Cities approach, the Supreme Court held that the
minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
could not be applied to the employees of state governments,""' because
federalization of a local government's or state's ability to determine its
employee's wages would infringe on a state's sovereignty." The Court held
that the federal wage regulation would impair essential governmental activities
by restricting local governments' freedom of choice in allocating local resources
to carry out traditional state and local government functions, and for this reason
7
the regulation could not be applied to state or local governments.'2
In the nine years between NationalLeague of Cities and Garcia, there were
four Supreme Court decisions in which the applicability of National League of

121. J. NOWAK, supra note 118, at 160.
122. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (applicability of the ADEA to state and
local governments); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, rehearing
denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982) (state public utilities and federal energy regulation); United Transp.
Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (applicability of Railway Labor Act to state-owned
commuter railroads); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(surface mining environmental controls); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
123. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
124. See Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity
From Commerce ClauseRegulation, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 35, 37 n. 14; Note, State Sovereignty Meets
the National Political Process, 54 UMKC L. REv. 369, 373 (1986).
125. 426 U.S. 833, 840-52 (1976).
126. Id. at 850-51.
127. Id. at 851 ('Application [of the 1974 amendments] will significantly alter or displace the
States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation... .[I]f Congress may withdraw from
the States the authority to make those fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems
for performance of these functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States'
'separate and independent existence.").
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Cities was a central issue."2 In none of these cases did the Court ultimately
find an immunity from federal legislation."2 One of these decisions that is of
particular importance to the issue of ADEA application to appointed state judges
is EEOC v. Wyoming."
In Wyoming, the Court held that Congress' 1974
amendment to the ADEA, extending the Act to state and government employees,
was a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and
that ADEA coverage of state and local government employees does not unduly
intrude on state sovereignty so as to violate the Tenth Amendment.' 31 The
Court further held that application of the Act to Wyoming does not "'directly
impair' the state's ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions,'"3 and that the state's interests are not seriously
threatened by the ADEA because the state remained free to continue requiring
approval of game wardens, providing it could demonstrate that age is a "bona
fide occupation qualification" for the job.' 33 According to Wyoming, the state
may continue to retire its employees, but must do so on an individual basis."

128. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
129. J. NOWAK, supra note 118, at 164.
130. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
131. 460 U.S. at 235-44.
132. Id. at 236-39. Of course, Wyoming was decided before National League of Cities was
overruled and thus applied the "traditional government functions" test that the Court later abandoned.
If application of the ADEA to the states did not violate the Tenth Amendment under the National
League of Cities approach, it certainly does not under Garcia.
133. Id. at 240. Congress recognized that employers should be permitted to use neutral criteria
not directly dependant on age, and that even criteria that are based on age are occasionallyjustified.
To this end, the Act provides that certain otherwise prohibited employment practices would not be
unlawful "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1988); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1625.6(a)-(c) and 1625.7(a)-(f) (1990). The
determination of whether an occupational qualification will be deemed to be "bona fide" to a specific
job and "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business," is determined on
the basis of all pertinent facts surrounding the particular situation. This exception to the Act must
be narrowly construed. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (a) (1990).
Section (c) states: "Many State and local governments have enacted laws or administrative
regulations which limit employment opportunities based on age. Unless these laws meet the
standards for the establishment of a valid bona fide occupational qualification under section 4(0(1)
of the Act, they will be considered in conflict with and effectively superseded by the ADEA." 29
C.F.R. § 1625.6(c) (1990). See also Note, The BFOQ Defense in ADEA Suits: The Scope of
'Duties of the Job," 85 MICH. L. RE'. 330 (1986).
134. 460 U.S. at 239. Vermont argued that EEOC v. Wyoming is not controlling because the
mandatory retirement policy in Wyoming affected game wardens rather than judges. However, as
the EEOC observed, Wyoming's rejection of the Tenth Amendment argument had nothing to do with
the particular position at issue. Rather, the Court focused on the availability of alternative,
nondiscriminatory methods for Wyoming to meet its needs, which are equally available as to judges.
Amended Brief for Appellee at 36, n.29, EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 896178).
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Because the Court never established a test for determining when a federal
law impaired the sovereignty of a state or local government in a "traditional
governmental function" to the extent that the regulation could not be applied to
those governmental units, the lower courts struggled with application of the
Tenth Amendment standard, which resulted in inconsistent applications of
NationalLeague of Cities. 35 This difficulty in part led the Court to hold in
Garcia that the judiciary has a very limited role in granting to state and local
governments an area of immunity from otherwise valid federal commerce power
legislation. '3 In Garcia, the Court overruled its decision in National League
of Cities' and abandoned the "traditional governmental function"" concept
as a limit on Congress' Commerce Clause power.'39 The Garcia majority
held that the national political process established by the Constitution was the
primary safeguard for state and local governments against legislation that unduly
burdened the states." Finding that the states have a meaningful role in the
creation of legislation, the Court observed that voters would not likely return to
office federal legislators whose actions destroy the ability of their state and local
governments to provide them with basic governmental services.' 4 The Court
later added in South Carolina v. Baker 42 that there could be no rejection of

135. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539 (1985) ("Thus far,
this Court has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed
protected under NationalLeague of Cities."). In that case the Court set forth examples of protected
and unprotected functions, see 426 U.S. at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no explanation of how those
examples were identified. See also Note, The Repudiation of National League of Cities, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 1048, 1068-71 (1984) (critical of National League of Cities). See also Van
Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709 (1985) (defending National
League of Cities as a modest sort of federalism restraint on Congress).
136. Id. at 546-47.

137. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
138. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
139. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985).
140. Id. at 552-57. The notion that states possess the ability to protect themselves through the
national political process surfaced initially in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 876-77, in the
dissent of Justices Brennan, White and Marshall. These dissenters observed that Congress is
constituted of Senate and House representatives elected from the States, and that decisions of
Congress concerning the "extent of federal intervention under the Commerce Clause into the affairs
of the states are in that sense decisions of the states themselves." (citing Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: 7he Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954)).
141. To demonstrate how meaningful this role can be, the Court cited examples of where the
states have effectively limited obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce Clause,
including The Federal Power Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, and the Sherman Act. 469 U.S. at 553.
142. 469 U.S. at 552-57; South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (*Although
Garcialeft open the possibility that some extraordinary defects in the national political process might
render congressional regulation of state activities invalid under the Tenth Amendment, the Court in
Garcia had no occasion to identify or define the defects that might lead to such invalidation."). See
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the decisions of the democratic process, as reflected in federal statutes, in the
absence of extraordinary defects in that process.' 43
Of course, there are limits on the power of Congress to regulate the states'
conduct.'" Garcia suggests that the judiciary may intervene if Congress takes
action that virtually eliminates the local functions of state and local governments
in the federal system."
Unfortunately, the opinion gave no indication of the
types of laws that might contravene this undefined limitation on the federal
power to regulate state and local governments.'"
The Supreme Court's holdings in Garcia and Wyoming clearly support the
proposition that application of the ADEA to appointed state judges does not
violate the Tenth Amendment. 4 First, the political process under which the
ADEA was extended to state employees lacks any indication of extraordinary
defects.'" The only state to challenge the political process under which the

also Fisher, ConstitutionalInterpretation By Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV. 707 (1985)
(arguing that Congress has ample resources to perform effective constitutional analysis); J. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980).
143. On November27, 1990, the Supreme Court granted certiorariin Gregory v. Ashcroft, and
presumably will reexamine Garciaand the power of the federal government to regulate state and
local government entities. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59
U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1990) (No. 90-50).
144. See 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (there exist "affirmative limits the constitutional structure
might impose on federal action affecting the states under the Commerce Clause').
145. See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), which left open the possibility that
the Tenth Amendment might set some limits on Congress' power to compel states to regulate on
behalf of federal interests. Id. at 761-64.
146. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. at 556, citing New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (Frankfurter, J.) ('The process of Constitutional adjudication does not
thrive on conjuring up horrible possibilities that happen in the real world and devising doctrines
sufficiently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest contingency. Nor need we go beyond that
required for a reasoned disposition of the kind of controversy now before the Court.'). The only
example provided by the Court of the federal government unduly burdening the states was Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (finding that the federal government may not tell a state where it
may locate its capital).
147. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990); Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F.
Supp. 330, 332 (E.D. Va. 1988) ('There are few limitations on Congress' power to legislate under
the Commerce Clause on matters of state sovereignty.').
148. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990) ('the absence of a given
legislator or legislators, so long as the legislative body's appropriate procedural rules have been
followed, does not mean that the national process leading to the enactment of a given piece of
legislation was flawed'); Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. at 332 ('There is no indication that the
political process under which the ADEA was extended to state employees, including judges, was
inadequate to protect the States from being unduly burdened by the federal government.'). When
Congress amended the ADEA in 1974 to extend coverage to state and local government employees,
see supra note 4, fully thirty six states appointed judges on at least one level. COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, Table 5 (1972-73). Certainly, the legislators from those
states were aware of their state's method of selection and could have questioned the application of
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ADEA was extended to state and local governments is Vermont. 49 Vermont
argued that the political process was defective because Vermont's senators were
not present at the vote."se However, the Second Circuit held that this absence
was insufficient to render the process extraordinarily defective under the GarciaBaker test. '' The proper recourse for any state dissatisfied with ADEA
application to its appointed judges is not through the courts, but through the
national political process. 2

the ADEA to appointed judges. Yet nowhere in the legislative history of the ADEA does any
discussion of ADEA coverage of appointed judges appear. The Senate voted 69 to 22 in favor of
the amendment. 120 CONG. REC. 5743 (1974). The amendment extending coverage passed in the
House by a margin of 375 to 37. 120 CONG. REc. 7337-38 (1974).
Moreover, members of Congress are required to take an oath of office to uphold the
Constitution. Therefore, all federal legislation, even pre-Garcia legislation, should be presumed to
be valid since legislators would vote against legislation they thought to be unconstitutional. The fact
that the Supreme Court did not make clear until 1985 in Garcia that the national political process
would be given such deference in legislation affecting the federal-state balance does not negate the
claim that members of Congress had an incentive to enact constitutional legislation, and to represent
the interests of their states. See Fisher, supra note 142, at 718-22; Brest, The Conscientious
Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975).
149. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990).
150. Id.
151. Id. The Supreme Court held in South Carolinav. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), that the
failure of South Carolina to even allege that it was deprived of any right to participate in the national
political process, or that it was singled out in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless, was
sufficient to support a finding that the national political process did not operate in a defective
manner. Id. at 512.
But see Brief for the Lincoln Legal Foundation, supra note 115, at 19 (the political process
did not function properly because before Garcia "Congress could reasonably anticipate that the
courts would act if Congress exceeded its constitutional authority"). This argument is fundamentally
flawed. It assumes that application of the ADEA would be unconstitutional today, but if Congress
reenacted the ADEA tomorrow, it would be constitutional.
Furthermore, Lincoln Legal
Foundation's argument that Congress could expect the courts to act if Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority fails to recognize that two years after Garciawas decided Congress amended
Title VII to extend its coverage to persons 70 and over. See Pub. L. No. 99-592. Congress, at the
same time, created additional exemptions to coverage, see Section 2(c)(1)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 623 and 631(c)(1).
152. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (in explaining its decision in Garcia,
the Court stated that "The Tenth Amendment limits on Congress' authority to regulate state activities
... are structural not substantive-i.e., that States must find their protection from congressional
regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined spheres of
unregulable state activity."). But see Schwartz, National League of Cities Again-R.I.P. or a Ghost
That Still Walks? 54 FoRD. L. REv. 141 (1985) (the Garcia holding that the judiciary could not
decide whether a federal law violated the limits on Congress' authority to regulate the states under
the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional system);
Comment, State Autonomy After Garcia: Will the Political Process Protect States' Interests, 71
IOWA L. REv. 1527, 1543 (1986)("In rejecting judicial determination of traditional governmental
functions, the Court has placed unwarranted faith in the ability of the political process to protect
states' interests.").
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Further, Garcia's recognition that federal legislation may be invalidated by
the federal judiciary when it goes so far as to virtually eliminate the functions
of state and local governments is simply inapplicable to ADEA protection of
state judges."5 3 Invalidating mandatory retirement provisions for appointed
judges will not eliminate or greatly impair any local or state function.'
Congress is simply requiring the states to utilize their existing judicial retention
and review procedures; it is not attempting to tell the states how to select their
55
judiciary, set the terms of judges, or dictate the duties of state judges.1
Admittedly, such legislation might extend beyond the "affirmative limits the
constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under
the Commerce Clause."" However, that concern is not raised by the ADEA,
which leaves a state with virtually total discretion in structuring its judiciary. 57
Moreover, extending ADEA coverage to appointed state judges will not
necessarily require additional administrative mechanisms to determine on an
individualized basis if a particular judge should be removed, since a state can
simply choose not to mandatorily retire its judges. Even if additional
mechanisms are required, they will not rise to the level of inconvenience
contemplated in Garcia."'s Every state presently has some form of review and
retention procedure for its judiciary, 159 thus demonstrating that the judicial
performance of sitting judges may be evaluated on an individualized basis

153. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985).
154. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
155. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 57 (lst Cir. 1988), where the court reasoned
that Congress is attempting to regulate the requirements a state can impose on those who hold office
in the state's judiciary. However, the Massachusetts court states too much. Congress may be
regulating one of the requirements a state can impose-an age requirement-but standing alone that
requirement does not rise to the level of greatly impairing any state function.
156. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985).
157. Compare Brief for the Lincoln Legal Foundation, supra note 115, at 17 (arguing that the
extension of the ADEA to appointed state judges will violate this affirmative limit, and citing Coyle
v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), where the Court held that a state's power to locate its own seat
of government is essentially a state power upon which Congress lacks the authority to impinge.).
Thus Coyle suggests that there is an enclave of sovereignty reserved to the states. But even
assuming this to be so, the discretion to choose the location of a state's seat of government surely
cannot be compared to arbitrary age discrimination. As EEOC v. Wyoming demonstrates, the
extension of the ADEA to the states does not infringe on the states' sovereignty so as to violate the
Tenth Amendment. 469 U.S. at 239.
158. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
159. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 5, at Table 4.5. Forty-eight states
currently have some type of judicial qualifications commission to evaluate the performance of sitting
judges and make recommendations to the Governor, General Assembly, or State Supreme Court
whether the judge should be removed for mental or physical disability. Id. The two states without
formal commissions, Arkansas and Vermont, delegate the review and removal of judges to the
Governor or Supreme Court. Id.
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without a prohibitive loss in public confidence in the courts and without
sacrificing judicial standards.
The First Circuit recently held that forced removal of judges is a sensitive
and problematic procedure, and a state's desire to avoid that procedure should
be respected. " Yet, the court provided no basis for this argument and
completely ignored the procedures already implemented in all of the states.
Furthermore, the argument that it is problematic to remove judges is simply a
superficial justification for mandatory retirement, which Congress has rejected
as a matter of national policy.'
The procedure of removing a judge may be
uncomfortable for the participants, but that inconvenience does not outweigh the
injustice of removing individuals from the judiciary who are perfectly capable
of discharging their duties. 62
Protecting appointed state judges from
mandatory retirement does not violate the Tenth Amendment because there were
no defects in the political process under which the ADEA was extended to the
states, and because the extension of the ADEA to state judges will not unduly
burden the states' right to determine the characteristics of their judiciary."3

160. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1988) ('Massachusetts does not wish
to take up the perilous task of evaluating the performance of its older judges, and impeaching ...
those the legislature feels are no longer qualified. This task is as undesirable as it is difficult....").
161. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
162. One additional argument advanced in support of rejecting ADEA coverage of state
employees as violative of the Tenth Amendment is that it intrudes on the state's right to determine
the characteristics of its judiciary. Mandatory retirement is supported by some courts as a necessary
procedure to maintain the quality of a state's judiciary, as well as create openings for younger
members of society who are more attuned to the views of the majority. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898
F.2d 794, 605-06 (8th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1988); Apkin
v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen'l, 401 Mass. 427, 435-36, 517 N.E.2d 141 (1988).
This argument, though, is flawed in two respects. First, there has been no evidence presented
by those courts recognizing such a right that individual evaluation of appointed judges in any way
infringes the states' right to the degree required by Garcia. The exception in Garcia requires that
the federal legislation virtually eliminate the function of state and local government. This exception
will rarely be satisfied, and certainly no basis is present for invoking the exception by virtue of any
alleged infringement on the state's right to determine who may serve on its judiciary. Second,
mandatory retirement cannot be justified as assuring the quality of a state's judiciary since the states
are obviously adequately prepared to make such determinations as to individual judges.
Furthermore, the premise that elderly judges are not sensitive to the views of the majority flies in
the face of Congress' purpose in enacting the ADEA of eliminating irrational, unjustified
employment decisions based upon assumptions about relationship between age and ability. See
Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Service, 715 F.2d 694, 698-99 (1983). See also S. Rep. 16853, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) ("Age alone has nothing to do with an employee's ability to work. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes served with distinction in the Supreme Court into his 90's.'). No evidence
has been adduced in any of the recent mandatory retirement cases that elderly judges are not capable
of recognizing the views of the majority, or the minority, for that matter.
163. Despite the seemingly straightforward application of Garcia and Wyoming to ADEA
coverage of appointed state judges, at least one amicus has argued that application of the ADEA to
appointed judges violates the Tenth Amendment. The ADEA application is asserted to violate the
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B. Degree of Specificity Required in FederalLegislation that Regulates a State
Activity
Although the courts have generally recognized that Congress has the power
to extend the ADEA to appointed state judges, all of the courts finding that the
ADEA does not protect appointed judges have held that when Congress attempts
to infringe on an area that strikes close to the heart of state sovereignty, it must
manifest its intent in clear and unequivocal terms.'" These courts required
more than Congress' clear and unequivocal intent to extend ADEA coverage to
state and local governments. Instead, they required clear congressional intent
to extend ADEA protection specifically to appointed state court judges because
legislation preempting a state law regarding the composition of a state's judiciary

Tenth Amendment because the composition of a state's judiciary is not commerce among the several
states and the application of the ADEA to appointed judges would force states with appointed
judiciaries to implement elections, thereby infringing on the state's ability to structure a core state
function. See e.g., Brief for the Lincoln Legal Foundation, supra note 115, at 20-25.
The argument asserted that the composition of a state's judiciary is not "commerce" and
therefore is beyond the scope of congressional regulatory power under the Commerce Clause is not
persuasive. Citing the common dictionary definition of commerce, and the definition of commerce
recognized at the time the Constitution was written and ratified, the LLF asserts that the functions
of the judicial branch of a state are not related to the definitions of commerce. Even though judges
adjudicate cases involving litigants, the arrangement and functioning of the court itself are attributes
of a sovereign government acting in a governmental capacity, the LLF argues. Brief for the Lincoln
Legal Foundation, supra note 115, at 20-25.
The Supreme Court has liberally construed the Commerce Clause to include any activity that
affects commerce among the states. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (surface coal mining affects interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (discriminatory operation of motel affected
interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (discrimination in restaurant
affects interstate commerce). Certainly state judges affect commerce among the states through their
decisions. Not only may their decisions involve litigants from diverse states, but these decisions
involve, for example, applications of tort, contract, and property law, areas of the law which
undoubtedly touch upon some aspects of commerce.
It is conceded that ADEA coverage of appointed state judges might give a state an incentive
to elect, rather than appoint, judges, to avoid the ADEA. However, no state is compelled to adopt
any particular means of selecting judges. Also, Wyoming held that states need not abandon their
goals, but may achieve them in a more individualized and careful manner. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
239 (1982). Clearly, states may retain an appointed judiciary and comply with the ADEA by
determining the fitness of their older judges on an individual basis. There is even the possibility that
the voters of a state with mandatory retirement for its appointed judges may not wish to revert to
an elected judiciary if the sole motivation is to avoid the ADEA and enforce mandatory retirement.
Public attitudes concerning mandatory retirement have changed over the last two decades and it is
possible that the voters will remain content with an appointed judiciary protected by the ADEA.
164. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts,
858 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1988); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen'l, 401 Mass. 427, 517
N.E.2d 141 (1988).
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alters the delicate federal-state balance."
This application of the "clear
statement rule" is inappropriate because it improperly extends the rule beyond
its Eleventh Amendment origin," it requires an analysis that was rejected in
Garcia as unworkable, 67 and it requires specificity in federal legislation that
is impracticable.'"
The clear statement rule has been invoked by the courts most often in the
context of the Eleventh Amendment.'" Despite the unambiguous language of
the Eleventh Amendment, To Congress may abrogate a state's constitutional
sovereign immunity and create a private cause of action against the states in
federal court. Because Congress has the power to provide for private suits
against states or state officials, which are constitutionally impermissible in other
contexts, 7' the federal courts must be certain of Congress' intent before
finding that federal law overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh
Amendment." 7 As the Court has acknowledged, this power is "carved out
of" 1 state sovereignty by the supremacy of federal law. 74

165. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir.) (because ADEA coverageof appointed
judges is a significant intrusion into properly state-dominated affairs, the court would look to see if
Congress "clearly and unequivocally manifested an intent to regulate the requirements a State can
impose on those who hold office in the state's judiciary").
166. See infra notes 169-82 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 190-200. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983) (state
interest in mandating retirement of game and fish
wardens does not require impossible demands of
specificity on the national legislature).
169. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("We ...affirm that
Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only
by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. The fundamental nature
of the interests implicated by the Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion.*). See also
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (unmistakable language is required to protect the
"'constitutionally mandated balance of power' between the States and the Federal Government ...
adopted by the framers to ensure the protection of 'our fundamental liberties.'"); Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
170. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subject of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
171. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
172. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985).
173. 427 U.S. 445, 455 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,346 (1880)) (concludingthat
the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the scope of state sovereign
immunity).
174. Congress' right to override the Eleventh Amendment has been widely criticized. Justice
Scalia is one of the most vocal critics of this right. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of
Income Maintenance, _ U.S. _,
109 S. Ct. 2818, 2824 (1989) (Scalia, J.,concurring) ('It
makes no sense to affirm the constitutional principle established by Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), that 'a suit directly against a state by one of its own citizens is not one to which the judicial
power of the United States extends, unless that state itself consents to be sued,' ... and to hold at
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In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, " the Supreme Court announced
that it will not look beyond the four corners of a statute to find congressional
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.' 76 Congress' intent to extend the
ADEA to state and local governments, and in effect, create private causes of
action against the states, was clearly and unequivocally evinced in 1974 when
Congress extended ADEA protection to state and local government
employees. 77 That Congress intended to extend the ADEA to state and local
governments was made manifestly clear by Congress' amending the definition
of "employer" to include the state and local governments, and amending the
definition of "employee" to exempt elected officials and their advisers." 7
Therefore, Congress has satisfied any requirement of clear statement to extend
the ADEA to state and local government employees, including appointed state
judges. 79
The recent decisions finding that the ADEA does not protect appointed state
judges have held that since ADEA protection of appointed state judges infringes
on sovereign rights protected by the Tenth Amendment, Congress must manifest
clear and unequivocal intent to extend the ADEA to state judges."s This
rationale for the clear statement rule, assuming that judges are so "important"
to the state as to require a higher standard of congressional intent, fails to
balance the state's interest in determining the characteristics of its judiciary
against the federal interest of banning arbitrary age discrimination. Congress
has repeatedly expressed its disapproval of mandatory retirement and has
consistently affirmed its intention that individuals be guaranteed the right to be
evaluated on an individual basis.""' Eliminating mandatory retirement based
solely upon age is an important federal policy endorsed by Congress, because

the same time that Congress can override this principle by statute in the exercise of its Article I
powers.").
175. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
176. Id. at 240.
177. Pub. L. No. 93-259, Section 28(a)(l)-(4), 88 Stat. 74 (1974), (amending 29 U.S.C. §

630(b)). 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) now provides in relevant part: "The term [employer] also means ...
(2)a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or political
subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency,.....
178. Supra notes 4 and 46-56 and accompanying text.
179. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983) (the Court declined to "override
Congress' express choice to extend its regulatory authority to the states"); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico
Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 698-99 (1st Cir. 1983) ([elxpress authority in Age Discrimination in
Employment Act for maintenance of suits against state employers was sufficient evidence to
demonstrate congressional will that Eleventh Amendment immunity be abrogated). See also
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976) (in enacting the 1972 amendments to Title VII,
Congress intended to override the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
180. Gregory v. Asheroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858
F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
181. See H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Ses. part 1, 2 (1977).
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age alone is a poor indicator of one's ability to perform a job."
This federal
interest must be weighed against the important interests of the state -- the
"interest" in discriminating solely on the basis of age.
Moreover, the reasoning of those courts requiring a clear statement to cover
judges directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's holdings in Wyoming and
Garcia.'8 When the Supreme Court overruled National League of Cities, it
did so in part because the framework announced in National League of Cities
proved too difficult to establish and produced inconsistent results.'" Yet the
First and Eighth Circuits require this exact type of determination when they hold
that a federal law that applies to state judges infringes on state sovereignty and,
therefore, requires a higher standard of congressional intent.'" Both the First
and Eighth Circuits held that because judges occupy a more "serious" role in
society, federal legislation affecting them requires a higher standard of
intent. 1
However, these courts failed to offer any test or analysis for
determining which state and local government positions occupy such "serious"
roles in society. Rather than force courts into making difficult determinations
about which state functions are traditional, the Supreme Court in Garcia
recognized that the political process is capable of protecting these traditional
state functions."s Accordingly, Congress may amend the ADEA to exclude
appointed state judges if it determines that extending the ADEA to appointed
state judges infringes on the state judicial selection process.'9
Finally, properly applied, the clear statement rule does not require explicit
mention of each official to be included within the scope of the ADEA. This
requirement would lead to the absurd result that no job categories are covered
because Congress did not explicitly include any particular class of officials when
it extended the ADEA to the states." g To satisfy this standard, Congress
would have had to explicitly list every position in every state government that
it wished to cover. 191 Instead, Congress broadly covered state "employees"
and then exempted certain state officials." The clear statement rule simply

182. Id.
183. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 13741 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
186. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858
F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1988). See also Brief for Appellants at 23, EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794
(2d Cir. 1990) (No. 89-6178).
187. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d at 600; EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 54.
188. See supra notes 13543 and accompanying text.
189. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988).
190. See supra notes 4 and 24 and accompanying text.
191. Amended Brief for Appellee, at 27, EEOC v. Illinois, No. 89-3421 (7th Cir.).
192. See supra notes 24 and 3541.
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requires that Congress "clearly state" that the ADEA be applied to the states,
and this requirement has plainly been met. "
An examination of pertinent Title VI1" language supports the proposition
that Congress need not explicitly mention state judges in the ADEA. Title VII
broadly bars discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, religion, or
sex.' 95 The definition of employee for Title VII purposes is identical to the
definition of employee found in the ADEA. " The Title VII legislative history
is devoid of any discussion of its coverage of appointed state judges, yet
certainly the defendants in the recent ADEA cases would not assert that state
and local governments may discriminate on the basis of race, religion, sex, and
national origin when determining the composition of their judiciary, without
running afoul of Title VII.
Requiring such explicit mention of appointed judges for ADEA purposes
creates a standard that is difficult to satisfy and one that has been squarely
rejected."9 Furthermore, requiring explicit mention of appointed judges leads
to the conclusion that the ADEA will not protect any state or local government
employees, including appointed judges, if a court deems that such employees
occupy a role in the state government that is somehow "central" to the state or
This would undermine Congress' express desire to
local government."
provide protection for state government employees." 9 The proper standard
to utilize in determining Congress' intent is simply whether Congress clearly
intended to extend the ADEA to state and local government employees, and not
whether it expressed a clear intent to cover appointed judges in particular.'
CONCLUSION

Appointed state judges are employees according to the terms of the ADEA.
Because appointed judges do not fit within one of the narrow exemptions to the
ADEA definition of employee, state laws mandating the retirement of appointed
judges are in conflict with the ADEA. The plain language of the ADEA
definition of employee leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to protect
appointed judges from mandatory retirement. The legislative history of the
ADEA, supplemented by the legislative history of identical Title VII provisions,

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(t (1988).
Id.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 3-4, 180-82 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
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supports the conclusion that Congress intended to exempt only specific
categories of policymakers. The only appointees at the policymaking level that
are exempted from coverage are the close and personal advisers of the elected
official. A reading of the exemptions that limits their reach to the executive and
legislative branches of government is fully supported by the legislative history
of the ADEA and Title VII. Therefore, the courts have no occasion to consider
if appointed judges are policymakers in the generalized sense of that term.
Furthermore, Congress may constitutionally extend ADEA protection to
state court judges. Congress clearly and unequivocally expressed its intent to
extend ADEA protection to state and government employees with its 1974
amendment to the ADEA. Courts should not interpret Congress' decision to
avoid the quixotic task of listing every state and local governmental employee
to be protected to mean that Congress did not intend to protect appointed judges.
What is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the recent decisions finding
that the ADEA does not protect appointed judges is the courts' conspicuous lack
of recognition of the balance between the competing federal and state interests.
The recent courts have allowed the states' interest in determining one
characteristic of their judiciary to override the federal interest in banning
arbitrary age-based discrimination. The states' interest is deserving of some
deference, but their interests can be adequately protected through an individual
assessment of the qualifications of the members of theirjudiciary. Requiring the
states to abandon their mandatory retirement laws for their appointed judges will
not unduly jeopardize the states' interest in determining who shall interpret their
laws. Instead, the repeal of these mandatory retirement laws will further the
important national policy of eliminating arbitrary age-based discrimination in the
workplace.
BRIAN M. WELCH
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